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Abstract 
Depending on the definition of the tax base, the statutory corporate tax rate implies rather 
different measures of effective average and marginal tax rates. This paper develops a model 
of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and intensive business investment 
and shows how these margins respond to changes in average and marginal corporate tax 
rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm's capital stock. Extensive investment 
refers to the firm's production location and reflects the trade-off between exports and 
foreign direct investment as alternative modes of foreign market access. The paper derives 
comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the cost of public funds 
depends on the elasticities of the extensive and intensive investment responses. 
__________ 
* The paper was presented at the 2006 public finance meeting of the German Economic 





Exports, foreign direct investment, corporate taxation, extensive and intensive investment, 
costs of public funds. 
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D21, F23, H25, L11, L22 1 Introduction
With increasing globalization and mobility of ﬁrms, international competitiveness has
become a dominating concern in recent tax reform. Policy makers give priority to creating
a favorable tax environment for internationally mobile ﬁrms. These ﬁrms tend to be the
most productive and proﬁtable ones. It is believed that a company’s average tax rate is
the decisive measure when a country wants to become more attractive as a location of
international direct investment. A low eﬀective average tax rate (EATR), compared to
other countries, helps to keep mobile ﬁrms at home and thus reduces outbound foreign
direct investment (FDI). It also helps to convince multinational enterprises (MNEs) to
establish subsidiaries (inbound FDI) and generate employment and income at home rather
than producing abroad and exporting to the domestic market. The EATR refers to the
discrete location decision of ﬁrms. The eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR), in contrast,
refers to the intensive margin of capital formation, making existing ﬁrms grow larger or
repeat investment of the same type. The EMTR is thus believed to be relevant for the
growth of domestic businesses which refrain from FDI and, if at all, serve foreign markets
via exports. The voluminous study of the European Commission (2001) on company
taxation in Europe has provided detailed compilations of various measures of EMTRs and
E A T R si na ni n t r a - E u r o p e a na n dw o r l dw ide comparison. The measurement of eﬀective
tax rates was recently summarized by Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) and Sorensen (2004).
Recent examples of tax reform proposals that aim to create an internationally more
competitive tax environment include, among others, the Technical Committee on Business
Taxation (1997) for Canada, the GCEA et al. (2006) and Scientiﬁc Advisory Board of
the German Ministry of Finance (2004) for Germany or the proposal of a growth oriented
dual income tax in Keuschnigg (2004) and Keuschnigg and Dietz (2006) for Switzerland,
among others. Even the U.S. with its large internal market has become more concerned
with the international impact of tax reform as the recent proposal by the President’s
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2006) testiﬁes. The proposal by the GCEA
(2006) for Germany, for example, compiles and internationally compares EATRs. To
3press its case, it demonstrates how the reform proposal signiﬁcantly improves Germany’s
ranking in an international comparison of EATRs at the company level. It is argued that
this better ranking reﬂects a major improvement in Germany’s stance in the international
tax competition game. Germany’s international position with respect to the EATR would
improve from 12th to 5th rank within the set of countries listed. Interestingly, the report
does not explicitely list EMTRs and only states the implied changes to the cost of capital.
Table 1 summarizes calculations for eﬀective tax rates from the European Commis-
sion’s (2001) report on company taxation in Europe and also includes EMTRs. For
Germany, the eﬀects of the 2001 tax reform are included. Both in terms of marginal and
average eﬀective rates, no European country except France puts a higher tax burden on
business investment than Germany. Also, the EATRs are considerably higher and much
dominated by the statutory company tax rate. This paper will also investigate whether
the EATR is the appropriate concept for measuring tax distortion at the extensive margin.
Country Corporate Cost of EMTR EATR
Tax Rate Capital
Austria 34.00 6.3 20.9 29.8
Belgium 40.17 6.4 22.4 34.5
Denmark 32.00 6.4 21.9 28.8
Finland 28.00 6.2 19.9 25.5
France 40.00 7.5 33.2 37.5
Germany 39.30 6.8 26,0 34.8
Greece 40.00 6.1 18.2 29.6
Ireland 10.00 5.7 11.7 10.5
Italy 41.25 4.8 -4.1 29.8
Luxembourg 37.45 6.3 20.7 32.2
Netherlands 35.00 6.5 22.6 31.0
Portugal 37.40 6.5 22.5 32.6
Spain 35.00 6.5 22.8 31.0
Sweden 28.00 5.8 14.3 22.9
UK 30.00 6.6 24.7 28.2
Source: European Commission (2001), Tables 7 and 8. Only
corporate taxes. Germany after 2001, Box 7, Annex Table 1a.
Table 1: International Comparison of Eﬀective Tax Rates
Much of the academic literature on the taxation of multinational investment (see the
reviews of Gordon and Hines, 2002, Gresik, 2001, Weichenrieder, 1995, and Janeba, 1997,
o rt h ep a p e r sb yH a u ﬂer and Schjelderup, 2000, and Davies, 2004, to mention a few recent
4contributions) does not connect very well with these descriptive measures of eﬀective
average and marginal tax rates. The dominant framework postulates that multinational
investment ﬂows occur until the marginal product of capital is equalized across countries.
Taxes may drive a wedge between gross returns to capital across countries and thereby
lead to an ineﬃcient international allocation of capital. It is not possible to rationalize
the role of EATRs in a framework that allows only for marginal investments but excludes
t h ed i s c r e t en a t u r eo fF D I .I n s p i r e db ye m p i r i c a lw o r ko fH i n e s( 1 9 9 6 )a n dD e v e r e u xa n d
Griﬃth (1998) and others, and lately discussed by Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002),
the recent theoretical literature has studied models of FDI in imperfectly competitive
markets to investigate the impact of taxes on discrete location choice (see Devereux and
Hubbard, 2003, Fuest, 2005, or Bond, 2000, for an early discussion). These papers,
however, tend to ignore the intensive margin of business investment which remains very
important for immobile national ﬁrms.
This rather new literature in public ﬁnance, however, misses a systematic treatment
that allows to identify the separate roles of EMTRs and EATRs for intensive and exten-
sive investment in a uniﬁed framework. The present paper ﬁlls this gap. It is not known
precisely how the corporate tax, by determining the average and marginal eﬀective tax
rates, impacts on the extensive and intensive margins of business investment. It is even
less known how the behavioral responses on these two margins determine the cost of pub-
lic funds as created by the corporate income tax. Ideally, one should be able to draw
a parallel to the literature on wage taxation in the presence of intensive and extensive
labor supply (see Saez, 2002, Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2006, and Kleven and
Kreiner, 2006). In fact, the paper shows that the cost of public funds from corporate
taxation can be parameterized in much the same way by appropriately deﬁning the be-
havioral elasticities of discrete and marginal business investment. This requires, of course,
a consistent welfare analysis of corporate taxation in imperfectly competitive markets, a
task which was deemed too complicated so far (see the published comments on Devereux,
Griﬃth and Klemm, 2002).
5Compared to standard public ﬁnance analysis, this paper takes an entirely diﬀerent
route to model discrete and marginal investment. It builds on new trade theory which
emphasizes the heterogeneity of ﬁrms and explains how ﬁrms choose between exports
and FDI as alternative means to serve foreign markets (see Melitz, 2003, Helpman, 2006,
Grossman and Helpman, 2005, and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004, among others).
We develop a much simpliﬁed, probabilistic version of the “Melitz model” with monop-
olistically competitive ﬁrms. To keep the model simple, we consider only outbound FDI
by domestic ﬁrms, ignore inbound FDI, and also eliminate productivity diﬀerences across
ﬁrms. Instead of productivity diﬀerences, our probabilistic approach introduces a foreign
market entry risk that diﬀers across ﬁrms. The symmetry of ﬁrms with respect to all
other characteristics keeps the model very tractable. Given extra ﬁxed costs associated
with FDI, only the ﬁrms with the highest probability of successfully entering foreign mar-
kets will prefer (outbound) FDI over exports. Firms that ﬁnd it diﬃcult to penetrate
foreign markets (low success probability of market entry) will not be able to break even
with the FDI alternative since FDI must also pay back the ﬁxed cost of establishing for-
eign subsidiaries. The choice between FDI and exports reﬂects a proximity concentration
trade-oﬀ: FDI saves transport costs but duplicates production and ﬁxed costs.
The fraction of ﬁrms choosing FDI and foreign production over exports and domestic
production deﬁnes the extensive margin of investment. It will be shown how the corpo-
rate tax, depending on the implied EMTR, aﬀects intensive investment and ﬁrm size by
inﬂating the user cost of capital. It will also be shown how the domestic corporate tax,
depending on the implied EATR, diminishes ﬁrm values from domestic export production
relative to ﬁrm values from foreign subsidiary production. The corporate tax thus aﬀects
extensive investment by reducing ﬁrm value from domestic export production and induc-
ing more ﬁrms to locate abroad. As a ﬁnal innovation, the paper will derive a welfare
based measure of the cost of public funds due to the corporate tax that will depend on the
extensive and intensive investment elasticities. Section 2 now proceeds in setting up the
basic framework. Section 3 states comparative static results and characterizes the costs
of public funds. Section 4 concludes.
62 The Model
The argument is based on a simple two period model of a small economy with monopolis-
tic competition and variable outbound FDI. In the ﬁrst period, a ﬁxed labor endowment is
employed to produce a traditional good (numeraire) which can be consumed or invested.
The traditional sector employs a Ricardian technology with a unit labor coeﬃcient and
p a y saw a g er a t eo fo n e .Aﬁxed number of n industrial ﬁrms each invests capital (stan-
dard good) in period one to supply diﬀerentiated goods in period two. Each ﬁrm is
endowed with a worldwide patent for a speciﬁc brand which is a close substitute for other
varieties. The ﬁrm faces demand worldwide and produces under conditions of monopolis-
tic competition. It is assumed, however, that foreign market entry is more diﬃcult than
supplying the domestic market and is therefore subject to risk. In consequence, ﬁrms will
always serve the domestic market but may or may not be successful in penetrating the
foreign market. In case of failure, the brand is not oﬀered abroad. Firms also confront
the discrete decision whether they should serve the foreign market via exports from home
subject to transport costs. Alternatively, they could save on transport costs by relocating
production abroad and serving the market locally. However, establishing a foreign sub-
sidiary company requires extra administrative and other ﬁx e dc o s t s .T ok e e pt h em o d e l
as simple as possible, we suppress production of diﬀerentiated goods by foreign ﬁrms.
Foreign consumption of varieties exclusively relies on imports (exports of home economy)
or subsidiary production of multinationals.
Decision making by ﬁrms follows a logical sequence. To begin with, ﬁrms inherit a
product design from past innovation and a probability that the product will actually be
valued by consumers. To keep things simple, we assume that a new product designed
by domestic ﬁrms always appeals to consumers in the home market. In contrast, the
ﬁrm may or may not be able to penetrate the foreign market. The success probability of
foreign market introduction varies for diﬀerent brands. Second, ﬁrms decide whether they
serve foreign markets with exports or FDI. Third, they choose capital investment which
ﬁxes plant size and sales volume. Fourth, ﬁr m sd i s t r i b u t ep r o ﬁts and consumers allocate
7income to innovative and traditional goods. The presentation of the model follows the
solution principle of backward induction and starts with consumer choice.
2.1 Demand
Domestic households are endowed with ﬁxed labor L w h i c hi sp a i daw a g ew =1per unit.
In the ﬁrst period, households earn ﬁxed labor income, consume a quantity C1 of the
standard good (numeraire) and save the rest. In the second period, savings S yield total
wealth RS including interest where R =1+r is one plus the interest rate. In addition,
agents receive proﬁts πe on ownership of monopolistic ﬁrms and get lump-sum transfers
z from the government. They spend C2 on consumption of the traditional good and E
on their purchases of n diﬀerentiated goods. Each brand is available at a producer price
pj and is consumed in quantity cj. Spending is constrained by ﬁrst and second period
budgets
C1 = L − S, C2 + E = RS + π
e + z, E =
Z n
0
(1 − ν)pjcjdj = n(1 − ν)pc. (2.1)
T h el a s te q u a l i t yr e ﬂects the symmetric nature of preferences and costs. We also include a
demand subsidy for diﬀerentiated goods at rate v. The subsidy is merely a technical device
that serves to eliminate the markup pricing distortion if needed (see e.g. Keuschnigg,
1998). Given producer prices pj, the consumer price is reduced to (1 − ν)pj.
Eliminating savings yields the intertemporal budget constraint. It will be convenient
to express it in second period units,
RC1 + C2 + E = LR + π
e + z. (2.2)
Assuming linearly separable preferences, present and future consumption are perfect
substitutes. The interest rate r must thus be equal to the subjective discount rate.
Consumers do not care when to consume but care only about total consumption. Life-
time utility in second period units is U = RC1 + C2 +
R n
0 u(cj)dj. Substituting (2.2)
U = LR + π
e + z +
Z n
0
[u(cj) − (1 − ν)pjcj]dj. (2.3)
8The square bracket gives consumer surplus from consumption of innovative goods. De-
mand follows from utility maximization which results in (1 − ν)pj = u0 (cj) or
u(cj)=A
1−α · (cj)
α /α ⇒ cj = A/((1 − ν)pj)
ε ,ε =1 /(1 − α) > 1. (2.4)
The parameter ε is the price elasticity of demand where 0 <α<1.
Foreign variables are marked by an upper index f. The foreign economy is endowed
with ﬁxed labor Lf. It uses an investment technology that converts one unit of the
standard good today into R units tomorrow. It is specialized in the production of the
standard numeraire good and is not engaged in innovate goods production. Varieties are
consumed in the second period only and stem from imports or subsidiary production of
multinationals. Since foreign market entry is risky, not all varieties on oﬀer in the home
country are also supplied abroad. Hence, nX + nI <n . Lower indices denote varieties
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After substituting (2.5), Uf = RLf +nX [u(cX) − pXcX]+nI [u(cI) − pIcI].D e m a n df o r




j). Using the same speciﬁcation as in (2.4) and











2.2 Home Market Production
The focus is on the home country’s production and trade of diﬀerentiated goods. To
save on notation, we suppress the variety index j. Firms invest k units of the standard
good in the ﬁrst period. Since capital does not depreciate, this investment yields k units
of the standard good in the second period. At the same time, capital is used in period
two to produce k units of a given brand of the diﬀerentiated good. The monopolistic
9ﬁrm supplies the entire domestic market for its brand, c = k, and earns revenues pk
equal to consumer spending as in (2.1).1 The government levies a proportional proﬁtt a x
(corporate tax) at rate t but allows a deduction of ek from the tax base. When e =1 ,
ﬁrms can fully deduct investment, making the corporate tax an investment neutral cash-
ﬂow tax. If e<1, the tax discriminates against investment. The discounted present value




(1 − t)pk +( 1− et)k
R
− (1 − et)k, π =( 1− t)pk − (1 − et)rk, (2.7)
where π stands for second period proﬁts. In period two, the government collects tax
revenue πT = t(pk + ek) − tekR = t(p − er)k.
In solving for optimal investment, the ﬁrm takes account of its monopoly position
c = k in the market for her brand. Using (2.4), the revenue function is seen to be concave
in capital,2 p(k)k = kα·A1−α/(1 − ν). Alternatively, using k = A/[(1 − ν)p]
ε,t h eﬁrm’s
revenue from domestic sales amounts to
p · k = A · (1 − ν)
−ε · p
1−ε. (2.8)
With this information, and slightly rewriting (2.7), the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm’s
investment follows from
π =m a x
k




where u stands for the user cost of capital. Taking account of the fact that any increased
output from additional investment reduces the producer price p, the optimality condition
becomes p − u + k · dp/dk =0 . Using the price elasticity given in (2.4) yields
α · p(k)=u, k = A · (α/[(1 − ν)u])
ε . (2.10)
1I nt h ea b s e n c eo ft a x e s ,t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo faﬁrm with investment k is (pk + k)/R − k which
amounts to π = pk −rk i fe x p r e s s e di ns e c o n dp e r i o dv a l u e s .M a r k - u pp r i c i n go v e rm a r g i n a lc o s t ,p>r ,
yields strictly positive proﬁts indicating an excess return on capital over its user cost r.T h e f o r e i g n
technology converts kf units of the standard goods into Rkf units tomorrow, yielding second period
proﬁts of πf = rkf − rkf =0 .P r o ﬁts are zero since capital yields no more than a normal return r.
2For this reason, we can keep technology linear. A concave net output function f (k) would only
complicate the analysis without additional insights.
10Price is a ﬁxed markup 1/α over the user cost of capital. The demand curve in (2.4)
determines the level of sales at this price which, in turn, yields output and capital invested.
Obviously, a higher demand subsidy stimulates output and sales. The marginal revenue
function αp(k) is like a downward sloping marginal product of capital curve in standard
investment models, yielding optimal capital where the marginal product is equal to the
user cost of capital. Figure 1 illustrates the investment problem of the monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm.
() p k demand
k








Fig. 1: Optimal Investment and Proﬁt
A closed form solution for proﬁts is found when using αp = u to substitute out u in
(2.9) which yields π =( 1− t)(1− α)pk. Replace pk by (2.8) and again use the markup
p = u/α to arrive at
π =( 1− t)B/u
ε−1,B ≡ (1 − α)Aα
ε−1/(1 − ν)
ε . (2.11)
2.3 Foreign Market Entry
A domestic ﬁrm with a given product design can sell its brand worldwide. Suppose now
that foreign market entry was successful and the ﬁrm has decided to produce at home
11and serve the foreign market with exports. Exports involve real trade costs θ − 1 of
s h i p p i n gg o o d sa c r o s sb o r d e r .T oc o v e rt ransport cost, the foreign demand price pX must
exceed the domestic producer price by a factor θ. For the same reason, an export ﬁrm
must produce a quantity kX >c X larger than what arrives at foreign consumers. The
diﬀerence is lost on cross border transport. Foreign demand prices and domestic producer
prices for exports are thus related by
pX = θp, kX = θcX,p X · cX = p · kX,θ ≥ 1. (2.12)
When the ﬁrm with a monopoly on brand j successfully picks up export business, it
must invest an extra kX of the standard good and will obtain value πX in addition to the
value π of serving the home market,
πX =( 1− t)pkX − (1 − et)rkX =( 1− t)(p − u)kX. (2.13)
The ﬁrm pays tax in the second period equal to πT
X = t(p − er)kX.
Since pX = θp, export demand in (2.6) is cX = Af/(θp)
ε and yields revenues
pkX = pXcX = A
f/(θp)
ε−1 . (2.14)
B yt h es a m es t e p sa sb e f o r e ,e x p o r t e r sc h o o s eam a r k u po fp r o d u c e rp r i c eo v e rt h eu s e r
cost of capital as in (2.10), αp = u.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,p r o ﬁts from export business amount
to πX =( 1− t)(1− α)pkX or
πX =( 1− t)B
f/u
ε−1,B
f ≡ (1 − α)A
f (α/θ)
ε−1 . (2.15)
Instead of exporting to the foreign market, the ﬁrm could have chosen FDI by estab-
lishing a foreign subsidiary. When producing locally, the ﬁrm faces foreign factor prices.
Since the analysis in this paper keeps foreign taxes constant and is exclusively concerned
with the intensive and extensive investment response to the domestic corporate tax, it
is useful to entirely suppress foreign taxes. Therefore, the user cost of capital invested
abroad is equal to the foreign interest rate, uf = r,w h i c hi s ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,e q u a lt o
12domestic interest. Having opted for FDI to serve the foreign market, the ﬁrm saves on
transport costs. For this reason, the ﬁrm can charge a lower price pI to foreign customers.
The value of the foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent company is
πI =( pI − r)kI. (2.16)
By similar steps as before, foreign subsidiaries set a markup of producer price over
foreign user cost of capital as in (2.10), αpI = r. The proﬁtd e ﬁnition thus yields πI =
(1 − α)pIkI =( 1− α)Af (α/r)
ε−1. The export versus FDI decision explained below will
be well behaved only if πI >π X. Comparing the closed form proﬁt terms, the inequality
is equivalent to 1/rε−1 > (1 − t)/(θu)
ε−1.I ti ss u r e l ys a t i s ﬁed in the absence of taxation
where u = r. If real trade costs are positive, θ>1, the condition reduces to 1 > 1/θ
ε−1
and is necessarily fulﬁlled since ε>1 as well. If taxes are not too large, the inequality
also holds with positive taxes.
2.4 Exports Versus FDI
The key element of the model refers to the choice of domestic ﬁrms to serve foreign markets
via two rivaling modes: exports or FDI.3 The decision deﬁnes the extensive margin of
domestic investment by relocating production and investing abroad if exporting becomes
less attractive than foreign subsidiary production. The simplest approach is to assume
that foreign market entry is risky and ﬁrms succeed only with probability q.A l l ﬁrms
attempt foreign market entry but some will not be successful so that there is a margin
of purely local ﬁrms that earn π only. Total proﬁt of successful ﬁrms from global sales
3To endogenize this margin, we choose a much simpliﬁed “Melitz model” of monopolistic competition
(see Melitz, 2003). Instead of considering ﬁrm heterogeneity in labor productivity, giving rise to a
distribution of unit costs, prices, demand and ﬁrm size, we assume identical productivity across ﬁrms and
keep the production and demand side symmetric. The only heterogeneity is the risk of foreign market
entry. Our assumptions much increase analytical tractability which has plagued the applications of the
Melitz model. One disadvantage is that we cannot capture how trade and ﬁscal policy change aggregate
productivity by aﬀecting ﬁrm composition. However, this aspect is not the focus of the paper.
13amount to π + πX for exporters and π + πI for a multinational company with foreign
subsidiaries. Ex ante, before success of foreign market entry is known, the expected value
of global sales is
¯ πX = π + q · πX, ¯ πI = π + q · πI. (2.17)
Preparing foreign market entry requires some ﬁxed costs such as building a distribution
network, fulﬁlling foreign regulations etc. They are normalized to zero for exports, fX =0 ,
making exports the default mode.4 Opting for FDI by establishing a foreign subsidiary
is more expensive. Suppose there are diﬀerential ﬁxed costs fI relating to FDI. Ex ante,
before the success of market entry is known, the expected present value of a foreign
subsidiary, net of these ﬁxed costs, would be q · πI/R − fI. In terms of second period
values it amounts to q · πI − F where F ≡ RfI.
As a result of past innovation, new product designs are endowed with variable proba-
bilities q of successful foreign market introduction. The success probability is drawn from
a distribution G(q).G i v e nq,t h eﬁrm decides whether to choose exports (default mode)
or FDI. The extra ﬁxed cost F necessary for FDI is lost without any gain if market entry
fails. FDI is therefore worthwhile only if ¯ πI−F>¯ πX. This condition holds only for those
products which come with the highest probability of successful foreign market entry. The
critical, indiﬀerent ﬁrm is deﬁned by5
q · (πI − πX)=F, F ≡ fIR. (2.18)
Figure 2 illustrates the choice between exports and FDI. Since exports give rise to
extra transport cost, variable proﬁts are larger when producing locally, πI >π X.F D I ,
however, gives rise to extra ﬁxed costs. If a ﬁrm will be successful in introducing her
brand in the foreign market with a low probability q only, then the diﬀerential proﬁt
4If fX were positive, some ﬁrms would not attempt foreign market entry at all and choose to stay
local from the beginning.
5Instead of (2.17), one could assume that new products appeal to all customers in the same way
so that the risk of market introduction is symmetric across regions. In this case, expected proﬁts are
¯ πX = q · (π + πX) and ¯ πI = q · (π + πI), giving rise to the same critical probability as in (2.18).
14πI − πX from FDI will materialize only rarely while the ﬁxed cost of establishing the
subsidiary will be necessary in any case. Choosing FDI instead of exports will thus not be
proﬁtable for ﬁrms with low success probability and pays only for ﬁrms that can expect to
be successful with high probability. Given the distribution of success probabilities across
ﬁrms, the identity of the critical ﬁrm then pins down the mass of exporters and the mass
of ﬁrms that go multinational by establishing a foreign subsidiary.
F
q 1 exports
I qF π ⋅−
FDI
X q π ⋅
F i g .2 :E x p o r t sV e r s u sF D I
According to Figure 2 and equation (2.18), all ﬁrms with success probabilities smaller
than the critical one, q0 <q , choose exports, the rest opts for FDI. In the aggregate, of all
n domestic ﬁrms, a fraction sX are successful exporters, a fraction sI are multinational
companies with foreign subsidiaries, and a share 1 − sX − sI were not successful in pen-

















From all n ﬁrms, nF = sF·n spend ﬁxed costs F because they attempt FDI. The remaining
share 1 − sF does not spend any resources on preparing FDI but rather remains with
exports or domestic sales if the export strategy fails.
15Since foreign market entry is risky and fails with (variable) probability q,t h en u m b e r
of successful market entrants is much smaller than the number of domestic ﬁrms, i.e.
sI <s F, sX < 1−sF and, thereby, sI +sX < 1.O fa l ln ﬁrms, a share 1−sI −sX is not
present in foreign markets but exclusively operates at home. Therefore, the range of goods
available abroad is smaller than the varieties at home. For completeness, one may also
compute the average success probabilities QI = sI/sF among all those which attempt
FDI. The ﬁxed costs of FDI preparation are thus wasted (1 − QI)sFn =( sF − sI)n
times. The average success probability among all ﬁr m sw h i c hc h o o s et h ee x p o r ts t r a t e g y
is QX = sX/(1 − sF).
From now on, we will normalize the mass of ﬁrms to unity, n =1 . Therefore, sX is the
number as well as the share of exporters among all ﬁrms, etc. In the aggregate, domestic
households appropriate in the second period monopolistic proﬁts with total value of
π
e = π + sX · πX + VI,V I =
R 1
q (q · πI − F)dG(q
0)=sI · πI − sF · F. (2.20)
The aggregate value of repatriated proﬁts from foreign subsidiaries, net of ﬁxed costs spent
abroad, is VI.R e p a t r i a t e dp r o ﬁts are part of the economy’s net foreign factor income.
2.5 General Equilibrium
The government is assumed to refund tax revenue in the second period net of the demand
subsidy as lump-sum transfers to households. Since corporate tax revenue stems only
from ﬁrms producing at home, the public sector budget is
z = t · (p − er)K − νpc, K ≡ k + sXkX. (2.21)
Aggregate savings must be equal to aggregate private capital investment, S = K.
Investment gives rise to demand for standard goods in the ﬁrst period and reﬂects the
investments for domestic and export sales. Goods demand sIkI caused by outbound FDI
of domestic MNEs represents demand for standard goods abroad. The appendix derives
aggregate output market equilibrium as a consequence of Walras’ Law.
163 Impact and Cost of Corporate Taxation
3.1 Eﬀective Average and Marginal Tax Rates
How exactly is an increase in the corporate tax rate changing the eﬀective marginal
(EMTR) and average tax rates (EATR)? Apart from reducing aggregate investment, what
is the relative impact on the intensive and extensive margins? To answer these questions,
one ﬁrst needs to clarify how the statutory rate changes the eﬀective rates that actually
work on the two margins. The EMTR refers to the tax burden on a ﬁrm’s last unit of
investment. The tax drives a wedge between the pre-tax return or marginal revenue αp
and the after tax return r. In pushing up the pre-tax return equal to the cost of capital,
it makes the last units of investment unproﬁtable and thereby impairs business growth.
Figure 1 illustrates. Expressing the wedge as a fraction of the gross return deﬁnes the











The EMTR relates gross and net returns by r =( 1− tm)u and summarizes all relevant
parameters of the tax code in a single measure of the distortion on the intensive margin.
It is well known that immediate investment expensing (e =1 ) transforms the corporate
t a xi n t oac a s h - ﬂow tax and consequently results in a zero EMTR. The tax is neutral on
the intensive margin because it reduces costs and returns of marginal investment by the
same proportion. When there is no expensing at all, e =0 , the EMTR coincides with the
statutory tax rate, tm = t.
The eﬀective average tax rate (EATR) is total taxes paid as a share of gross income.
In an intertemporal model, the relevant concept is the ratio of the present value of tax
liability over the gross, social present value of the ﬁrm. Using (2.7), the relevant values







· t, 1 − ta =
π




17The EATR is larger than the statutory rate, ta >t ,i fe<1. In this case, the costs of
capital are only partly deducted from gross returns, implying that the tax base is broader
than economic proﬁt. With immediate expensing, e =1 , EATR equals the statutory rate,
ta = t, while the EMTR is zero. With π∗ being the gross value of the ﬁrm, net proﬁts
and tax payments are π =( 1− ta)π∗ and πT = taπ∗ where π∗ = π + πT.
To characterize the comparative static response to tax reform, we compute changes
of variables relative to their values in the initial equilibrium. The hat notation indicates
relative changes such as ˆ u ≡ du/u. The exceptions are changes in tax rates which are
expressed relative to net of tax prices, e.g. ˆ tm ≡ dtm/(1 − tm).S i n c e (1 − tm)u = r
and given a constant markup, user cost and producer price change in proportion to the
EMTR,
ˆ p =ˆ u = ˆ tm. (3.3)
How are the eﬀective rates changed by an increase in the statutory rate? The EATR
is an endogenous tax measure that must be determined jointly with the impact of taxes
on equilibrium. Its relative change is found by log-linearizing the equation for 1 − ta in




p−r. Appropriately expanding and noting (3.3) gives
ˆ ta = ˆ t +
r
p − r
· ˆ tm, ˆ tm =
1 − e
1 − et
· ˆ t. (3.4)
A ﬁrst insight is that the statutory rate changes the EATR both directly as well as
indirectly via its impact on the EMTR. Quite intuitively, a cash-ﬂow tax with immediate
expensing is neutral on the intensive margin. In this case, the AETR is identical to the
statutory rate, ˆ tm =0and ˆ ta = ˆ t, and will be seen to distort extensive investment.
3.2 Investment and Proﬁts
The EMTR pushes up the user cost of capital and leads ﬁrms to charge higher prices. To
sustain higher prices, the monopolist must cut back sales and invests less. By the demand
curve in (2.4),
ˆ k = −ε · ˆ u = −ε · ˆ tm. (3.5)
18The ﬁrm’s net of tax proﬁt depends both on the average and marginal tax rates. To
see this, note that gross proﬁti sπ∗ =( p − r)k,l e a v i n gan e to ft a xp r o ﬁt π =( 1− ta)π∗.
Gross proﬁt in log-linearized form is ˆ π
∗ =
p
p−r · ˆ p + ˆ k. Substitute the preceding results,
ˆ π =ˆ π






· ˆ tm − ˆ ta = −
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t, ˆ πX =ˆ π. (3.6)
The third equality states the net eﬀect which is induced by the statutory rate. It is
directly obtained by applying the envelope theorem to (2.7), dπ/dt = −(p − er)k,a n d
dividing this by π =( 1− t)(p − u)k.6 Ac a s h - ﬂow tax, e =1 , is not distorting intensive
investment and yields tm =0and ta = t. An increase in the statutory rate would thus
leave gross proﬁtu n a ﬀected, ˆ π
∗ =0 , and reduce net of tax proﬁtb yˆ π = −ˆ ta = −ˆ t.
Other things being constant, an increase in the statutory tax rate reduces exporting
proﬁts in exactly the same way. Although the level of demand is diﬀerent, the relative
change in net proﬁts is the same because the demand elasticity is identical in home and
foreign markets. Assuming that the home country applies the exemption method to avoid
double taxation, proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries net of foreign corporate tax are exempted
at home. Hence, proﬁts πI from FDI are unaﬀected by domestic taxation as is evident
from (2.16). Investment of foreign subsidiaries depends only on foreign user cost that is
possibly inﬂated by foreign taxes.
The FDI export trade-oﬀ is illustrated in Figure 2 and formally resolved by ﬁxing the
cut-oﬀ value q in (2.18). Log-diﬀerentiating yields ˆ q =ˆ πX · πX/(πI − πX) since proﬁts
πI of foreign subsidiaries are exogenous from the home economy’s perspective. Inserting




· ˆ πX, ˆ πX = −
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t. (3.7)
Domestic corporate taxation raises outbound FDI for two reasons. First, it raises
the EATR and thereby reduces the net of tax proﬁt from exporting, making it more
6The two expressions are equivalent. Use ε =1 /(1 − α) and eliminate α by the condition (2.10) to get
ε = p/(p − u). Insert this and ˆ ta from (3.4) into the round bracket and get ˆ π = − u
p−uˆ tm − ˆ t. Substitute
now for ˆ tm and use u from (2.9) to obtain, after some rearrangements, ˆ π = −
p−er
p−u · ˆ t.
19attractive to serve foreign markets via FDI. Second, it also raises the EMTR, thereby
impairing investment and company growth and reducing proﬁts from domestic export
production. The net eﬀect is given in (3.6) and makes exports less proﬁtable relative to
the FDI alternative. In reducing the cut-oﬀ v a l u et h a ti d e n t i ﬁes the critical ﬁrm, the tax
shrinks the number of domestically producing exporters. As more ﬁrms decide to serve
foreign demand locally by relocating production abroad, the decomposition of ﬁrms into
exporters and multinationals changes in favor of MNEs. Log-diﬀerentiating (2.19) gives
the formal impact on ﬁrm shares,
ˆ sX = µX · ˆ q, ˆ sI = −µI · ˆ q, ˆ sF = −µF · ˆ q, (3.8)
where the coeﬃcients µX ≡ q2g(q)/sX, µI ≡ q2g(q)/sI and µF ≡ qg(q)/sF are deﬁned
as positive values.
Aggregate investment reﬂects intensive (via k and kX) and extensive investment (via
sX). Noting ˆ k = ˆ kX, linearization of national investment in (2.21) yields
ˆ K = ˆ k +
sXkX
K






A higher EMTR reduces investment on the intensive margin, i.e. by ˆ k, while a higher
EATR impairs investment on the extensive margin via reduced export proﬁts ˆ πX.W h e n
exports become less proﬁt a b l er e l a t i v et oF D I ,m o r eﬁrms decide to relocate production
and investment by establishing a subsidiary company close to foreign customers.
Proﬁts of exporters and multinationals at home are diﬀerent since only exporters are
subject to transport costs and must therefore charge higher prices. Consequently, sales
and proﬁts are smaller. The corporate tax might thus aﬀect aggregate proﬁts πe not only
by diminishing the value of exporting proﬁts but also by aﬀecting the composition of
ﬁrms. By (3.8), the eﬀect of the cut-oﬀ probability on ﬁrm composition satisﬁes dsX =
qg(q) · dq = −dsI. Hence, expected proﬁts in (2.20) change by πeˆ π
e = πˆ π + sXπXˆ πX −
[q · (πI − πX) − F]g(q)dq. The last bracket is zero due to the endogenous export FDI
choice. Substituting out the change in proﬁts as in (3.6) yields
π
eˆ π
e = −(π + sXπX) ·
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t. (3.10)
203.3 Cost of Public Funds
The deadweight loss of the corporate tax reﬂects the fact that the welfare loss imposed on
the private sector exceeds the extra tax revenue that is raised by government. To quantify
the diﬀerence, it is convenient to deﬁne the tax base B and rewrite tax revenue, net of
the demand subsidy, as
z = t · B − ν · p · c, B ≡ (p − er)K. (3.11)
Corporate tax revenue is T = t·B and changes by dT =( 1− t)B
h
ˆ t + t
1−t ˆ B
i
.T h et a x
base responds to both ﬁrm size and location choice. If investment shrinks on the extensive
margin, it leaves the margin p−er constant but erodes the tax base by lowering investment
K.S m a l l e rﬁrm size, however, not only reduces K but also comes with a counterveiling
eﬀect on the tax base since reduced output boosts prices and thereby inﬂates the margin
p − er.M a k i n gu s eo fˆ p = −ˆ k/ε and (3.9), the tax base adjusts by






The elasticity µ of the tax base with respect to intensive investment is non-negative.
With full expensing, e =1 , the user cost is equal to the interest. Markup pricing yields
p/(p − er)=1 /(1 − α)=ε, giving µ =0 . If no investment deductions are allowed,
e =0 , the elasticity emerges as µ = α and is strictly positive.
By earlier deﬁnitions, one can express the tax liability and net proﬁts of an export
ﬁrm in terms of the average tax rate: t(p − er)kX = taπ∗
X and (1 − t)(p − u)kX =
πX =( 1− ta)π∗




1−ta. Consequently, one can
rewrite the impact on proﬁts in (3.7) as ˆ πX = − ta
1−ta
1−t
t · ˆ t. Substitute this together with
ˆ k = −εˆ tm = −ε(tm/t)ˆ t, where the last equality uses (3.4) and (3.1), to get
t
1 − t









· ˆ t. (3.13)
The change in corporate tax revenue noted after (3.11) thus becomes










· ˆ t. (3.14)
21The ﬁrst term in the square bracket is simply the direct revenue eﬀect from raising the
tax rate. The second term relating to ε captures the distorting eﬀect of the tax rate on
intensive investment (or ﬁrm size) and on the producer price which both aﬀect the tax
base. The third term relating to η is the value reducing eﬀect of the increased statutory
tax rate which implies an extensive adjustment via η.
To characterize the deadweight loss, one starts by calculating the welfare change in
(2.3), dU = πeˆ π
e + dz − (1 − ν)cdp. The last term reﬂects the loss of consumer surplus
when the price marginally increases, see Figure 1. To evaluate this formula, we ﬁrst use
(2.9) and (2.13) to show that net proﬁts and the tax base B are related by




In consequence, the impact on total proﬁts in (3.10) is πeˆ π
e = −(1 − t)Bˆ t. Further, (3.11)
implies a change in transfers to housholds equal to dz = dT −ν·d(pc). Substituting these
results and using c = k,a n dˆ p = −(1 − α)ˆ k from (2.4) together with ˆ k = −εˆ tm,t h e
welfare diﬀerential becomes
dU = −(1 − t)Bˆ t + dT − (1 − v − α) · pk · εˆ tm. (3.16)












ˆ t, Ω ≡






T h el a s tt e r mΩ in the bracket reﬂects the eﬀect of markup pricing on consumer surplus.
In reducing intensive investment, the tax reduces sales and thereby leads to higher prices
which cuts into consumer surplus. This could be oﬀset with an appropriate demand
subsidy, which would ensure (1 − ν)p = u and thereby equate consumer price to marginal
cost. Since markup pricing results in αp = u, the required subsidy would be 1−ν = α.I f
the demand subsidy were optimally chosen in the initial equilibrium, the pricing distortion
is eliminated (Ω =0 ). When the tax marginally increases the user cost and the producer
price, the welfare impact of the price increase is zero to the ﬁrst order. Of course, the
welfare loss also disappears with 1=e since in this case the tax does not distort intensive
22investment, leaving user cost and producer price unaﬀected. The ﬁrst two terms in the
square bracket relate to the twofold investment distortion. The distortion on the intensive
margin depends on the EMTR and the intensive investment elasticity ε. The distortion
on the extensive margin depends on the EATR and the extensive elasticity η.
W ec a nn o wm e a s u r et h et a xd i s t o r t i o ni nt erms of the marginal deadweight loss per






1−t · µε + ta
1−ta · η + Ω · ε
1 − tm
1−t · µε − ta
1−ta · η
. (3.18)




1−t · µε − ta
1−ta · η
. (3.19)
Except for the extra term Ω referring to the markup pricing distortion, this formula is
entirely parallel to the analysis of intensive and extensive labor supply distortions. It
compares, for example, with MCPF formula in equation (III.34) in Keuschnigg (2005)
which is based on Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2006) and Kleven and Kreiner
(2006) and earlier work of Saez (2002).
To evaluate the formula more fully, it is useful to discuss two special cases. Consider
ﬁrst the case where ﬁxed costs of FDI are prohibitive which prevents any multinational
investment at all. Therefore, the share of successful exporters sX is ﬁxed (and sI = sF =0
in 2.19) which eliminates the extensive margin of investment, η =0 . One is exclusively
left with the standard distortion on the intensive margin where corporate taxation reduces






The cash-ﬂow tax (e =1 ) would be entirely neutral in this case, reducing tm and Ω to
zero. The tax is neutral not only with respect to intensive investment but thereby also
avoids the loss in consumer surplus from the pricing distortion.7 The marginal cost of
public funds would be one as with a lump-sum tax.
7The pricing distortion Ω could be eliminated in any case with a demand subsidy v =1− α.
23A second useful case to consider is an increase in the cash-ﬂow tax with immediate
expensing (e =1 ). The EMTR is kept to zero since the tax entirely avoids the intensive






The cash-ﬂow tax is thus not neutral in an economy with multinational investment. The
magnitude of the distortion and the cost of public funds associated with the corporate
tax depend on the EATR and the extensive elasticity η. This elasticity is deﬁned in
(3.9) and measures by how much aggregate investment K declines as more ﬁrms relocate
investment and production from home to the foreign country in response to an increasing
proﬁtd i ﬀerential πI − πX between export and FDI sales.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
To the best of my knowledge, the public ﬁnance literature has not provided so far a
consistent characterization of the intensive and extensive investment distortions associated
with the corporate tax, or other taxes at the personal level which aﬀect ﬁrm values and
capital accumulation within ﬁrms. This gap is all the more serious since the policy oriented
discussion has recently assigned a very prominent role to the importance of EATRs (see,
for example, GCEA et al., 2006, or European Commission, 2001). The policy report by the
GCEA does not even present any detailed calculations of the proposed reform on EMTRs
but emphasizes much the reduction of EATRs. A ﬁrst insight from the theoretical analysis
is that, strictly speaking, the EATR is not an independent concept but rather depends on
the statutory rate as well as the EMTR. The eﬀective marginal rate aﬀects ﬁrm growth
and changes the ﬁrm’s gross of tax value and the present value of tax payments. It thereby
enters the EATR which is the ratio of these two values.
Traditional thinking is probably still much dominated by the excess burden associated
with intensive investment. If one appropriately considers the extensive response, the
24marginal cost of public funds must probably be revised up quite substantially since the
tax shrinks aggregate investment on two margins: First, all domestically active ﬁrms
invest less. Second, some ﬁr m sn ol o n g e rb u i l dn e wp l a n t sa th o m ef o re x p o r tp r o d u c t i o n
but rather build them abroad to be closer to foreign customers. The welfare cost of the
corporate tax is therefore importantly related to the size of the EATR and the extensive
elasticity. This elasticity determines how many plants are built abroad rather than at
home in response to a tax induced increase in diﬀerential net of tax proﬁts.
Appendix: Market Clearing
Substituting the savings investment identity S = K into the budget C1 = L − S in (2.1)
gives domestic output market equilibrium in the ﬁrst period,
C1 + K = L. (A.1)
GDP Y1 = L consists of traditional sector outputo n l ya n di ss p e n to nc o n s u m p t i o na n d
investment K. The model does not explain trade in the ﬁrst period.
To obtain the GNP identity in the second period, insert πe from (2.20) and S = K
into the second period budget constraint (2.1). Using also the proﬁtd e ﬁnitions of π, πX
and πI and the public sector budget (2.21) yields
C2 + pc = Y2 ≡ pK + K + VI. (A.2)
The ﬁrst two terms on the right side amount to domestic GDP consisting of the output
v a l u eo fi n n o v a t i v ea n dt r a d i t i o n a lg o o d s .T h el a s tt e r mi sp r o ﬁt repatriation from foreign
subsidiaries. Adding this to GDP gives domestic GNP Y2 which is equal to domestic
absorption. There are no imports of diﬀerentiated goods.
Note that a monopolist supplies the entire market, c = k.U s i n gK = k + sXkX,t h e
GNP equation is rearranged to give
(C2 − K) − sXpkX = VI. (A.3)
25T h eb r a c k e to nt h el e f ts i d ei si m p o r t so fs t a n d a r dg o o d s .T h es e c o n dt e r mi se x p o r t so f
diﬀerentiated goods. The trade balance deﬁcit (excess imports) must be equal to foreign
factor income which stems from proﬁt repatriations of foreign subsidiaries.
The foreign economy is, by assumption, not producing any innovative goods. By the
Ricardian technology, output in the ﬁrst period is equal to labor Lf. Without trade, ﬁrst
period output market equilibrium is Lf − C
f
1 = Sf = Kf +sIkI + sFfI, where aggregate
foreign savings must pay for local investment Kf plus inbound FDI investment demand
sIkI + sFfI.S a v i n g se a r nar e t u r nr and yield second period income RSf derived from
output of the standard good. Income is spent on standard goods and on imported or FDI
produced varieties. Foreign GNP amounts to Y
f
2 = RSf and is spent on consumption of





2 + sXcXpX + sIcIpI. (A.4)
GNP abroad is lower than GDP because of proﬁt repatriations leaving the country. To see
this, substitute savings Sf as noted above, expand by +VI −VI, and use πI =( pI − r)kI





f + sIkI + sIpIkI − VI. (A.5)
Combining (A.4-5) and using the monopoly position cI = kI of foreign subsidiaries yields
the foreign trade balance condition,
RK
f + sIkI − C
f
2 = sXcXpX + VI. (A.6)
T h el e f ts i d ei sn e te x p o r t so fs t a n d a r dg o o d sw h i c hm u s tp a yf o ri m p o r t so fi n n o v a t i v e
goods and proﬁtr e p a t r i a t i o n s .
Adding up (A.3) and (A.6) and noting cXpX = pkX yields world market clearing for









The ﬁrst bracket stands for traditional sector output abroad and the second bracket for
traditional sector output at home.
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